Fukuda v. City of Angels, Cal. 3rd, 1999 DAR 6215
(June 22, 1999)
* Court: California Supreme Court
* Public Agency: City of Angels
* Plaintiff's Job Class: police officer
* Trial Court's Decision: in favor of plaintiff
* Appellate Court's Decision: in favor of plaintiff
* California Supreme Court's Decision: mixed
* Attorneys for Plaintiff: Franscell, Strickland, Roberts
& Lawrence
* Attorneys for Amicus: Steve Silver, (Argued before court for PORAC
LDF: Michael Lackie).
* Issue Areas: petitions for writ of administrative mandate, burden
of persuasion, independent judgment test
Fukuda Facts
* Fukuda was a veteran officer with the City of Angels, a city made
up of Angels Camp and Altaville.
* Around midnight on a day in mid-August 1992, Fukuda chased after
and apprehended a reckless driver.
* The department fired Fukuda due to his reckless driving in chasing
the suspect, including driving in the opposite direction of traffic,
engaging in a "rolling roadblock", nearly being rammed by the
suspect's vehicle, pursuing outside the city limits, and misrepresenting
facts concerning the incident in his report.
* Fukuda appealed his termination, pursuant to the MOU, to an
advisory hearing officer selected by the city council, with the hearing
officer upholding the termination.
* The city council adopted the hearing officer's recommended
decision.
* Fukuda filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate, and the
superior court, ruling that the burden of persuasion rested with the
city, found that the city had not met its burden on most of the factual
issues and that termination was excessive with respect to the issues on
which the city had met its burden.
* The appellate court upheld the superior court and ruled that the
city bears the burden of persuasion and that a strong presumption does
not attach to the findings of an administrative agency.
* The California Supreme Court by a 7-0 margin held that the burden
of persuasion does rest with the plaintiff, not with the city, in the
context of a trial court's review of a petition for writ of mandate and
that a "strong presumption of correctness" applies to the
findings of administrative agencies, even where the independent judgment
test also applies.
Analysis of the California Supreme Court's decision in Fukuda
* This is an important, albeit somewhat technical, decision; the
Supreme Court affirmed that, even where the independent judgment test
applies, a "strong presumption of correctness" does apply to
the factual findings of administrative agencies.
* The court notes that CCP section 1094.5, the section providing for
administrative mandate, was enacted in 1945.
* Prior to the enactment of CCP section 1094.5, the Supreme Court had
ruled that a "strong presumption of correctness" attaches to
the findings of administrative agencies, even where the independent
judgment test also applies.
* Interestingly enough, the voters in 1942 rejected an initiative
that would have prohibited the use by a court of the independent
judgment test.
* The Judicial Council report that recommended to the legislature in
1945 the enactment of CCP section 1094.5, a report which the Supreme
Court in 1947 concluded was equivalent to legislative history,
recognized the Supreme Court's earlier rulings concerning the
presumption of correctness of administrative findings.
* The Supreme Court and various appellate courts in the 1970's and
1980's repeated the Supreme Court's earlier formulation of the
presumption of correctness.
* The legislature's subsequent failure over the years to amend CCP
section 1094.54 to modify or eliminate this court-created presumption
confirms that the legislature agrees with the presumption.
* The court specifically rules that the burden at issue here is
actually and in fact a burden of proof, sometimes called the burden of
persuasion, and is not simply a burden of producing evidence, a much
less significant burden.
* Unlike the appellate court, the Supreme Court does not find any
logical inconsistency with requiring a trial court to both give
deference to administrative findings and also to exercise independent
judgment on those findings. The "court is free to substitute its
own findings after first giving due respect to the agency's
findings".
* Somewhat ominously, the court also stated that the independent
judgment test may not be constitutional based, even where fundamental
rights are involved, provided that the underlying administrative hearing
had been fair. Thus, an opening is made for legislative repeal of the
independent judgment test somewhere down the road.
Conclusion
This is an important and unsettling case, albeit on a somewhat
technical issue. It reconfirms the antique "strong presumption of
correctness" of administrative findings. Superior court judges will
have a tough time reconciling the presumption with the independent
judgment test. More decisions in this area will doubtless be
forthcoming. But, on a practical note, many judges may just ignore the
technicalities announced in this decision and decide mandate cases just
as they always have. The LDF beat back the effort by the City of Angeles
to do away with the "independent judgment test."
